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ESSAY
Paul A. Goble*
Federalism and Human Rights in the
Soviet Union
Introduction
Mikhail Gorbachev has presided over a radical transformation of Soviet
life. No areas have seen greater changes than the closely interrelated
ones of federalism and human rights. Prior to Gorbachev, the Soviet
Union had one kind of human rights problem; now, despite all of
Gorbachev's improvements it has another. This unintended change
largely resulted from Gorbachev's own reforms. This essay will consider
the Soviet Union's new human rights problem, which has received little
attention and yet poses serious difficulties for both Moscow and the
West.
First, this essay examines how ethnicity was an essential element in
the USSR's formation, contributing to its coercive character, ethnic ine-
quality, and pattern of human rights abuses. Second, it examines how
Soviet human rights abuses can be classified in relation to ethnic domi-
nation. Third, it explores how Gorbachev's revitalization campaign has
changed the nature of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union by trans-
forming ethnic and power relationships. In conclusion, this essay sug-
gests that Gorbachev's new system poses cognitive and political
difficulties for both Moscow and the West because it ignores the funda-
mental conflict between individual rights and the right to national self-
determination.
I. The Centrality of Nationality in Soviet Political Life
Scholars have long sought the causes for Soviet human rights violations.
Rarely have observers considered the nationality structure of the Soviet
population.
Prior to 1917, the Russian Imperial State was not organized on eth-
nic lines. Individuals were not required to declare their nationality in
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any official way. Religion and language were registered, but for many
groups-, these two primordial ties did not correspond to ethnic ones. As
a result, many subjects did not know who they were in ethnic terms; and
the names their groups bore were generally imposed from outside.
Demonstrating this early lack of ethnic identity, three-quarters of all eth-
nic groups in the USSR have names which in their own languages simply
mean "human being."
Rapid social change of the late Imperial period and the even more
rapid social mobilization generated by Russia's involvement in World
War I caused an increasing number of ethnic groups to become self-
conscious. This new national awareness led to further ethnic consolida-
tion as well as the advancement of political demands. The demands of
three Caucasian nationalities, the Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Georgi-
ans, became the most famous only because they were the most definite.
Less focused but perhaps more serious was the consolidation of Russian
identity. This consolidation was marked by the formation of the Provi-
sional Government, whose largely Russian members believed that the
Imperial regime was not responding to Russian interests.
Had Russia withdrawn from World War I, this consolidation pro-
cess might have led to the relatively easy secession of many groups and
the emergence of a democratic system in Russia. Whether any Russian
government would have tolerated Ukrainian or Belorussian secession is
a difficult question-few Russians saw the Ukrainians and Belorussians
as distinct nationalities. Prior to World War I, Ukrainian and Belorus-
sian departure would have been easier because Russia was a food
exporter at that time. Unfortunately, the Provisional Government was
unable to withdraw from the war, and the ensuing Bolshevik coup d'etat
prevented a more healthy pattern of development.
In contrast to the Provisional Government, Lenin and the Bol-
sheviks were starkly anti-national, at least ideologically. This anti-
national sentiment had two consequences, each of which was to have
profound implications for the future of the Soviet state and human
rights there. First, anti-national ideology sparked revolts and secession
by many peoples on the periphery of the country, Russians and non-
Russians alike. Second, Lenin and the Bolsheviks sought to spread
revolution and the belief that national interests must be subordinate to
class interests. Such beliefs led to the costly and dramatic reconquest of
Russia's periphery and the spread of the revolution into Poland by force.
In spite of Lenin's partially successful efforts, the Soviet Union
emerged more Russian because many non-Russian portions of the
empire had managed to secede. At the same time, Lenin had to control
his country by force, because so many of the non-Russian groups could
be retained only in that way. In 1897, only forty-three percent of the
Empire's population were Russians; by the end of the Russian civil war,
their share had climbed above sixty percent largely because of the
departure of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states. Simultaneously,
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Soviet authorities controlled the periphery, thus creating a strategic
zone des armes for further expansion.
By creating national republics, the Soviet socialist republics of later
fame, Lenin hoped to set a pattern for world revolution. At the second
congress of the Comintern in 1920, Lenin argued that these republics
could be prototypes for a future Polish Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), a
future German SSR, and ultimately even an American SSR. Lenin did
not explicitly contemplate a Union, but his vision suggests such a model.
In contrast, Stalin, who set the tone for most of the rest of Soviet
history, explicitly sought a union of the republics. A Georgian by birth
and a Russian by conviction, Stalin dismissed Lenin's grand plan for the
spread of revolution and the gradual incorporation of the rest of the
world. In a confidential letter to Lenin, published only in the third edi-
tion of Lenin's works, Stalin said that countries which had experienced
self-government would be unwilling to accept voluntarily the status of a
union republic, which he pointedly noted was not much different from a
provincial regime.
Moreover, Stalin drew certain politically dramatic conclusions from
the demographic and political changes wrought by the Russian civil war.
On the one hand, Stalin used his position as Commissar for Nationality
Affairs to create an ever larger number of political units based on
nationality both as a sop to nationalist aspirations and as a convenient
slot for his political supporters. It is seldom remarked, but Stalin never
won much political support in Moscow and Leningrad until after Lenin
had died. Stalin relied on the ethnicity of the provinces to win Party
backing. On the other hand, Stalin played on Russian fears of more
secession to justify repression. To isolate his political opponents, Stalin
tapped into Russian anger toward other ethnic groups such as the Jews
and Caucasians, who had played such a large roll in the revolution.
Finally, Stalin relied on Russian self-confidence to generate support for
his thesis of socialism in one country rather than backing Lenin and
Trotsky's more traditionally Bolshevik call for world revolution.
To support this system, Stalin expanded the significance of official
nationality. Every Soviet citizen had to be able to identify himself in
ethnic terms. That identification would place the citizen in a particular
category, depending on the political standing of his group. As the 1926
census makes clear, this identification process was no easy task. At that
time, a large number of Soviet citizens still did not know their ethnic
background. An even larger group identilied themselves in ethnic terms
that had nothing to do with ethnic identity. But, by the 1930s, when
Stalin introduced the internal passport system, virtually everyone could
recite his or her nationality.
Simultaneously, Stalin created a four-tiered scheme of national
statehood: Union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts,
and autonomous districts. Depending upon their size, location, and
political position, Stalin put ethnic groups in different categories. All
ethnic rights were given to territories rather than to their constituent
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individuals and groups. Ethnic groups without territories or near the
bottom of Stalin's ranking of nationalities had few privileges and had
difficulty retaining their identities. Indeed, many such groups appear to
to have disappeared by design.
To maintain such a system required enormous force. Many ethnic
groups accepted this force as the price of holding the country together
against a foreign threat. Although there were other reasons for the rise
of the Stalinist State, the federal system was one of the most powerful
factors in determining the repressive nature of the country. Stalin's
republics were artificially created nationality institutions without real
powers. By insisting that everyone identify as a member of a particular
nationality, Stalin had created a potentially explosive situation should
any ethnic group think it could recover real power. Such an explosion
could only be contained by force which, if removed, would unleash all
the problems hidden by decades of oppression. Stalin counted on his
cadres to understand the reality of Soviet power: the Union cannot sur-
vive without oppressive force. It is this reality that Gorbachev did not
and does not understand.
H. Human Rights Abuses and the Republics
As a result of this system which continued to function largely as Stalin
had intended into the 1970s, human rights violations in the USSR were
closely linked to the federal system. Human rights violations were at
least as prevalent in non-Russian regions as in Moscow. However, such
abuses remained largely ignored because they were far more difficult to
document. Essentially, there are three broad categories of abuses:
those typical of the Soviet Union as a whole, those common to all non-
Russian areas, and those peculiar to specific nationalities and their par-
ticular state structures.
Violations found throughout the USSR through the 1970s included
political abuse of psychiatry, imprisonment of dissenters, and restric-
tions on religion and travel. These abuses may have been worse in the
republics than in Moscow and Leningrad because the local authorities
did not have to contend with Western journalists, who could be counted
on to pass the information abroad. Thus, even though more human
rights violations may have occurred in the republics, little information
on this subject was available in the West.
Violations common to all non-Russian areas of the USSR included
denial of national self-determination, inability to pursue an independent
foreign policy despite the trappings of state power, restrictions on the
free flow of information about the past and present, and limitations on
the use of native languages and cultural facilities. Such violations were
generic rather than specific and consequently were most difficult to
document.
The third category of violations involved a specific national group.
They reflected geographic location and the local elites. In the Ukraine,
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for example, Moscow suppressed the Ukrainian Catholic Church
because of Moscow's general anti-religious policy, the Church's histori-
cal links to Rome, and Uniate identification with Ukrainian national
aspirations.
Violations in this third category were occasionally well-docu-
mented. One particularly good illustration of these violations is the case
of Azerbaijani treatment of the Georgian national minority. The Geor-
gians of Azerbaijan have long been subject to harassment that is generi-
cally Soviet and specifically Azerbaijani. The Azerbaijanis forced
assimilation of Georgians by closing Georgian language schools and
restricting Georgian access to higher education. They also refused to
issue birth certificates to children with Georgian names and changed the
nationality line in the passports of local Georgians regardless of their
own preference. The Azerbaijanis systematically underreported the
number of Georgians in the region in order to reduce the amount of
community services available to them.
Other colorful and unfortunate stories could be recounted, but the
point is that ethnicity stood at the center of the Soviet Union human
rights problem for two reasons. First, ethnicity represented a challenge
to authority that had to be countered. Second, it provided the basis for
attacks by one group against another. Unless these factors are acknowl-
edged, the human rights problem in the USSR cannot adequately be
understood.
MT. Gorbachev and the Transformation of the Soviet Human Rights
Situation
Historically, the Soviet system was based on repression of non-Russians
by Russians, who were in turn repressed by Moscow. Moscow justified
this system as the price of maintaining the empire. Gorbachev's reform
program unintentionally called both halves of the repression equation
into question. Since Lenin, Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader who
never worked in a non-Russian republic at any point in his career. He is
also the only Soviet leader not to have publically addressed nationality
questions before coming to power. As a result, Gorbachev launched a
reform program which addressed the repression of Russians by Moscow,
but failed to address ihe ethnic repression of non-Russians by Russians.
Had the country been ethnically homogeneous, Gorbachev's reform of
one half of the repression equation would have worked.
Gorbachev's sponsorship of a reduction in the power of central
institutions and control mechanisms, and his encouragement of mobili-
zation movements throughout the Soviet Union have transformed the
country. On the one hand, official abuses of human rights by central
authorities have notably decreased in number. On the other hand,
abuses by one group against another, especially by locally dominant
majorities against minorities, have increased dramatically.
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Earlier, Russians had enjoyed a protected status in the republics as
essentially Moscow's men on the scene. That status has changed; now
Russians often are threatened with minority status themselves. At pres-
ent some sixty million Soviet citizens-more than one-fifth of the total-
live outside their home ethnic territories and another seven million are
members of groups lacking such territories. Roughly half of the sixty
million are Russians. For the first time, ethnic Russians have become a
minority.
As republics have assumed greater powers and as republic leaders
have become more responsive to the populations rather than to Mos-
cow, republic nationalities-Russian and non-Russian alike-are
increasingly putting pressure on these new minorities. Some of the vic-
tims of this pressure are familiar-the Jews and other Diaspora peoples.
But most victims are new and are faced with the difficult task of defend-
ing themselves in a world not of their own making.
Conclusion
While the political task is difficult for those involved, it poses a challenge
to outsiders as well. Increasingly in Soviet society, two sets of rights are
coming into conflict: the individual rights of citizens and the collective
right of nationality groups to self-determination. In the past, we in the
West have been better able to defend individual rights because they are
the basis of our liberal civilization. Now, in defending those rights in the
current Soviet context, we may find ourselves sometimes allied with
those who want to deny ethnic groups the right to choose their own
destiny. It will not be easy to balance these rights, but unless we are
conscious of the need to consider both and understand how Soviet fed-
eralism interacts with human rights, almost certainly we will end by
betraying our most important values.
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